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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Court to find a sufficiently "specific and perfected" lien under Revised
Statutes, Section 3466, and now under Section 3670 of the Internal
Revenue Code, indicates that amendments to these two sections are
highly desirable. Such amendments should bring these sections into
conformity with the federal priority philosophy Congress has expressed
elsewhere,5 8 thereby eliminating the remaining vestiges of the secret,
unrecorded federal claim and achieving a greater degree of certainty
as to creditors' rights. These goals appear impossible of attainment
under the present state of the law.
ROBERT E. GILES.
Negligence-Contributory-Obstructions of View
at Railroad Crossings
The failure of a traveler crossing a railroad to obtain a clear view
of the track from any point, when he may do so in safety, renders him
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in North Carolina, and his
case will not be allowed to go to the jury.' This rule was recently
illustrated by the case of Parker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.2  Plaintiff
stopped at a farm crossing with the front of his truck eight or ten feet
from the near rail, at a point where an embankment prevented his see-
ing more than seventy-five to eighty yards up the track. He then
entered the crossing and collided with a train. The court held motion
for nonsuit should have been granted since plaintiff's evidence disclosed
that he could have stopped in safety at a point which afforded him clear
vision. This rule has had sustained approval since Harrison v. North
Carolina R.R.,3 but its application has not always been certain.
The general principles of the duty of a traveler in crossing a rail-
road track have been many times repeated.4 It is generally held that
tainty. For an excellent example of the effect on lower federal courts, see Bank
of Wrangell v. Alaska Lumber Mills, 84 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. Alaska 1949) (ad-
mitting the impossibility of reconciling the decisions, and the dicta, the court held
that a mortgage, in a lien jurisdiction, was superior to federal priority under
Section 3466).
18 The Bankruptcy Act §§64 and 67, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11
U. S. C. §104 (1946) and 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §107(1946).
'This rule, of course, assumes the existence of some negligence on the part
of the defendant railroad, which will generally be a failure to give proper -warn-
ing. This note does not attempt to deal with the problem of what constitutes neg-
ligence on the part of the railroad. For a general discussion of the problem of
crossing accidents see Blair, Automobile Accidents at Railroad Crossings in North
Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REv. 223 (1945).
2 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950).
3194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927).
'The basic North Carolina cases on duties of both parties at a railroad cross-
ing are probably Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690
(1913) ; Coleman v. A. C. L. R.R., 153 N. C. 322, 69 S. E. 251 (1910) ; Cooper
v. N. C. R.R., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932 (1905).
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the duty to stop, look, and listen is relative, depending on the situation
in the particular case. A failure to exercise these precautions is a cir-
cumstance for the consideration of the jury in determining contributory
negligence,5 though in some states a failure to stop is contributory
negligence as a matter of law.6
The duty to stop arises most frequently in cases where there is
some obstruction to the view of the track immediately adjacent to the
crossing. The greater the danger at a crossing, the greater is the care
required of both the traveler and the railroad.1 The increased duty of
the railroad to give warning may be taken into account by the traveler
in crossing and by the court in establishing the standard of care required
of him.8 The duty to look and listen is continuing and should be per-
formed at a time and place when looking and listening will be effective. 9
The traveler must select a vantage point from which he can see the
track, even though he may have stopped once already where the view
was obstructed.' 0 The precise number of feet from the track where
observation should be made cannot be set down as a rule," but the duty
does not require that a traveler go beyond a place of safety into the
zone of danger itself.12
If vision is completely obstructed by obstacles or obscured by weather
conditions, or if a clear view may be obtained only in the area of danger
itself, the traveler in going forward may ordinarily rely on his sense
of hearing and on the increased duty of the railroad to give warning."8
There is no absolute duty for the driver of a vehicle to alight and look
up and down the track before proceeding across.
14
' Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933) ; Elliot v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 150 U. S. 245 (1893); Harris v. Black Mountain Ry., 199 N. C. 798, 156
S. E. 102 (1930). N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-143 (1943) specifies that a failure to
stop shall not be contributory negligence per se, and this is interpreted to mean
that a failure to stop is a circumstance to be considered in determining con-
tributory negligence, whether by the court or the jury. Conn v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 201 N. C. 157, 159 S. E. 331 (1931).
'This is known as the "Pennsylvania Rule.' Benner v. Philadelphia & R.
KR., 262 Pa. 307, 105 Atl. 283 (1918).
" Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913).8 Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933).
'Kilmer v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 45 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1930); Godwin
v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 1, 161 S. E. 541 (1941); Johnson v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913).
"o Pennsylvania Ry. v. Yingling, 158 Md. 169, 129 Atl. 36 (1925); Parker v.
A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S.E. 2d 370 (1950).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-143 (1943) requires motorists to stop within 50 feet
of the tracks.
2 Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950) ; Pokora v.
Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933).
" Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Cooper v. N. C. R.R, 140
N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932 (1905).
"' In a famous dictum, Justice Holmes once laid down the rule that the driver
must get out if necessary in order to see the track. B. & 0. R.R. v. Goodman,
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The above-mentioned principles have fairly general acceptance. It
is primarily in their application as a question of law for the court or
of fact for the jury that the differences among the various jurisdictions
appear. It is the general rule that where the view at a crossing is not
obstructed or obscured in any way, and the traveler enters upon the
crossing oblivious to his danger and is injured, he is guilty of con-
tributory negligence which bars his recovery as a matter of law."8 Of
course, if the plaintiff saw the train coming and still attempted unsuc-
cessfully to get across, nonsuit is proper.1 6
If the view of the tracks is in some way obstructed, the prevailing
rule seems to be that whether the traveler selected the proper place for
looking and listening is a question of fact for the jury, and the plaintiff
will not be denied recovery as a matter of law.17 Another line of
authority has developed since the much-discussed case of Baltimore &
Ohio Ry. v. Goodman,18 in which the United States Supreme Court
found contributory negligence as a matter of law where a motorist failed
to obtain a clear view in safety after passing obstructions close to the
track. As a part of this development, North Carolina, in the case of
Harrison v. North Caroliua R.R. (in which the court quoted exten-
sively from the Goodman opinion), switched over from its earlier ad-
herence to the general rule and held nonsuit proper in this situation.19
Since the Harrison case, North Carolina has applied its rule in numerous
other cases.
The practical application of the rule leaves questions in need oL
clarification. At what point does it become unsafe to approach closer
to a crossing in order to look, and at what point does it become per-
missible to rely upon the sense of hearing and upon warnings by the
railroad? The answer, of course, depends in large part upon the manner
275 U. S. 66 (1927). This rule was disavowed in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292
U. S. 98 (1933), in which the court said that "a driver may learn nothing by
getting out about the perils which lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat
and sets the car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him."
11 Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Bailey v. N. C. R.R., 223
N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).11 McCrimmon v. Powell, 221 N. C. 216, 19 S. E. 2d 880 (1942); Lamm v.
A. C. L. R.R., 213 N. C. 216, 195 S. E. 381 (1938).
7 Morgan v. Detroit, J. & C. R.R., 234 Mich. 497, 208 N. W. 434 (1926);
Newhard v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 Pa. 417, 26 Atl. 106 (1893); Morrissey v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 55 S. D. 497, 226 N. W. 731 (1920). Contra: Pokora
v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Yingling, 148 Md.
169, 129 Atl. 136 (1925).
8 275 U. S. 66 (1927), where the obstructions were 18 feet from the track.
Comment 6 N. C. L. R1v. 212.
10 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). The earlier North Carolina rule is
expressed in Shepard v. Norfolk & Southern R.R., 166 N. C. 539, 82 S. E. 872(1914), and Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690
(1913).
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of transportation and the degree of mobility which the traveler pos-
sesses.20  In reckoning the limit of distance from the track to which a
safe approach may be made with a vehicle, the overhang of the loco-
motive beyond the side of the track and the projection of the vehicle
forward of the driver have to be considered. 2 ' Secondly, how far must
the view of the track extend to be considered "clear"? In most of the
cases where nonsuit is granted, the track is "straight," or clear as "far
as you can see."2 2  Where witnesses have given estimates of the dis-
tance for which the view was clear, nonsuit has been granted when the
estimate was as low as seventy-five or eighty yards, but for the most
part the estimates have been several hundred yards or more.23  If the
view is not completely obstructed by virtue of some obstacle immediately
beside the crossing, but the lay of the track itself is such that an ap-
proaching train is hidden until it is almost upon the crossing, the chances
of getting to the jury increase. This may occur where the .track curves
sharply24 or is hidden from view by a deep cut or hollow.
25
2 Wehe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 97 Kan. 794, 156 P. 742 (1916).
"1 Thus it would seem that the closest safe distance for a motor vehicle would
be at a point where the driver would be in the neighborhood of 10 feet from the
track, allowing 2 to 3 feet for the locomotive overhang, 6 or 7 feet for the pro-jection of the vehicle in front of the driver, and clearance. Thus, where obstruc-
tions come to within 3 or 4 feet of the near rail, nonsuit is not granted. Lincoln
v. A. C. L. R.R., 207 N. C. 787, 178 S. E. 601 (1935) ; Collett v. Southern Ry.,
198 N. C. 760, 153 S. E. 405 (1930). The same decision was reached where the
obstruction was 8 to 10 feet from the near rail. White v. N. C. R.R., 216 N. C.
79, 3 S. E. 2d 310 (1939). A survey of the cases shows that the closest point
to which obstructions have extended with nonsuit resulting was 10 to 15 feet from
the track. Godwin v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 1, 161 S. E. 541 (1931); Harrison
v. N. C. R.R., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). In Parker v. A. C. L. R.R.,
the driver stopped with the front end of his truck 8 to 10 feet from the track, and
this placed him about 15 feet away. For obstructions occurring beyond this range,
there have been numerous instances of nonsuit. Caruthers v. Southern Ry., 232
N. C. 183, 59 S. E. 2d 782 (1950) (24 feet); Hampton v. Hawkins, 219 N. C.
205, 13 S. E. 2d 227 (1941) (30 feet). Horsedrawn vehicles have a long pro-
jection forward of the driver and, in addition, probably would be allowed a greater
area of danger because of the excitability of the animals. Bicyclists and pedes-
trians have a much greater degree of mobility and a shorter distance of danger,
but even so, if a pedestrian has to look around a box car immediately beside the
track to see, the case may be allowed to go to the jury. Riggsbee v. A. C. L. R.R.,
190 N. C. 231, 129 S. E. 580 (1930). As a practical matter, it would seem un-
likely that obstructions would come to within 10 feet of the tracks except in the
case of other railway cars standing on a parallel track.
22 Boyd v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 2d 789 (1950) ; McCrimmon
v. Powell, 221 N. C. 216, 19 S. E. 2d 880 (1942); Godwin v. A. C. L. R.R., 220
N. C. 281, 17 S. E. 2d 137 (1941).
-"Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950); Penland
v. Southern Ry., 228 N. C. 528, 46 S. E. 2d 303 (1948) ; Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200
N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931). In Tart v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 52, 161
S. E. 720 (1931) the view was straight for three-quarters of a mile.2 Loflin v. N. C. R.R., 210 N. C. 404, 186 S. E. 493 (1936); Baker v. High
Point, T. & D. R.R., 202 N. C. 478, 163 S. E. 452 (1932); Moseley v. A. C. L.
R.R., 197 N. C. 628, 150 S. E. 184 (1929).
5 Bundy v. Powell, 229 N. C. 707, 51 S. E. 2d 307 (1948).
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The factors of decision are not so limited, however, as the foregoing
discussion might seem to indicate. In determining whether a case of
negligence and contributory negligence is one for the jury or one ex-
clusively for the court, "the factors of decision are numerous and com-
plicated, and practically every case must stand on its own bottom." 26
The fact that the traveler was familiar with the crossing or with the
train schedule is an additional factor in establishing negligence; con-
versely, unfamiliarity with either is an aid in getting to the jury.2 7 The
type of road crossing the track is also important, as obviously the
traveler has less reason to expect a warning and should use more care
at a farm crossing than at a major highway. 28 Other factors which
may have weight in carrying the case to the jury are fault of the rail-
road in causing the obstruction,29 presence of weather or heavy traffic
conditions increasing the difficulty of seeing,30 and some degree of reli-
ance by the traveler on the presence of a watchman or warning signals.3 1
Although for some time after the Harrison case the application of its
rule was somewhat uncertain, and although one case has suggested that
there are two lines of cases on the subject,32 it seems that the contra-
dictions may be explained in part by the presence of some of the above
factors and in part by an increasing tendency of the Court to decide
more railroad crossing cases as questions of law.
Where the obstruction to the view is of a temporary or transient
character the traveler must wait for it to cease or pass on, in order
effectively to fulfill his duty to look and listen.33 The prevailing rule
is that failure to wait until the view clears is contributory negligence
as a matter of law.34 North Carolina in following this rule grants non-
suit where the traveler fails to wait long enough to get a clear view after
2" Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637 (1938).
" Nonsuit was given in Riddle v. Southern Ry., 114 F. 2d 259 (M. D. N. C.
1940) ; Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950) ; Caruthers
v. Southern Ry., 232 N. C. 183, 59 S. E. 2d 782 (1950); and several other cases
in which familiarity was emphasized, and denied in Harper v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 211 N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937), where the driver was unfamiliar with
the crossing.28 Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950).
2
" Hill v. Norfolk & Southern R.R., 195 N. C. 605, 143 S. E. 129 (1929);
Blum v. Southern Ry., 187 N. C. 640, 122 S. E. 562 (1924).
"oHarper v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 211 N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937).
21 Finch v. N. C. R.R., 195 N. C. 190, 141 S. E. 550 (1928).
"2Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931).
2 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 129 Atl. 36 (1925) ; Dickinson
v. Erie R.R., 81 N. J. L. 464, 81 Atl. 104 (1911) ; Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C.
527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931)
"4 Fletcher v. Fitchburg R.R., 149 Mass. 127, 21 N. E. 302 (1889); Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 N. E. 826 (1927). Contra: Cook
v. A. C. L. R.R., 196 S. C. 230, 13 S. E. 2d 1 (1941).
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another train35 or automobile36 passes, or until smoke and steam from
another train lifts from the crossing.3
7
Where the view is obscured by adverse weather conditions, the
traveler may rely on warnings by the railroad and on greater use of
hearing. Thus, if there is fog 38 or snow,39 or the night is dark and
rainy,40 the jury is allowed to pass on the question of whether plaintiff
maintained a proper lookout. But the weather conditions must be such
as to cut down visibility substantially: a cold and foggy morning with
hazy atmosphere has been called a borderline case, 41 and a drizzling rain
in the daytime has been held not enough to prevent nonsuit. 42
Ordinarily the negligence of the driver of a vehicle will not be im-
puted to a passenger, but where the driver's negligence is so palpable
and gross as to be the proximate cause of the accident, it "insulates"
the first occurring negligence as a matter of law.43 Negligence of the
driver under the rule Harrison case in failing to obtain a clear view
after passing obstructions may have this result. But because the negli-
gence of the driver must be palpable and gross, the Court would prob-
ably be more reluctant to declare that the railroad's negligence was
insulated as a matter of law in a suit by a guest, on the same showing
of negligence. This relaxation of the rule would allow his case to go
to the jury where the obstruction to view was farther from the track
than would be allowed where the driver was suing.
44
The doctrine of "last clear chance" has not been applied in the
cases where the driver's failure to obtain a clear view before entering
a railroad crossing has resulted in nonsuit. The Court gives the reason
that "the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the con-
tributory negligence of the injured party bars recovery as a matter of
law."' 45 It would seem, however, that the real reason for not applying
"5 Moore v. A. C. L. R.R., 203 N. C. 275, 165 S. E. 708 (1932).
"Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931).
1 Lee v. Southern Ry., 180 N. C. 413, 105 S. E. 15 (1920).
"8 Meacham v. Southern Ry., 213 N. C. 609, 197 S. E. 189 (1938) ; Dancy v.
A. C. L. R.R., 204 N. C. 303, 168 S. E. 200 (1933).
King v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 200 N. C. 398, 157 S. E. 28 (1931).
40 Collett v. Southern Ry., 198 N. C. 760, 153 S. E. 405 (1930).
Harper v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 230 N. C. 179, 52 S. E. 2d 717 (1949).
'o Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935).
"Hinnant v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932) ; Blair, Auto-
mobile Accidents at Railroad Crossings it; North Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REv. 223
(1945). On the subject of the duty of an automobile passenger generally, see
Note, 28 N. C. L. Ray. 302 (1950).
"George v. Atlantic & C. R.R., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E. 324 (1934). In
Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N. C. 415, 20 S. E. 2d 561 (1942), a nonsuit was granted
against the passenger when there was nothing to obstruct the view of the driver
past bushes 30 to 40 feet from the track.
"' Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935); Redmon v.
Southern Ry., 195 N. C. 764, 143 S. E. 829 (1928).
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the doctrine in these cases is that the engineer does not have oppor-
tunity to stop in time to prevent the collision after the plaintiff comes
from behind obstructions onto the track in front of the train.46
The present strict application of the rule that a traveler must, if
possible, get a clear view of a railroad track which he is crossing may
be a part of an increasing trend by the North Carolina Court to decide
contributory negligence cases as questions of law.47 At any rate, the
acceptance of this rule is now settled. The conflicting cases on its appli-
cation can probably be explained by the presence of modifying factors,
rather than by reason of any doubt as to its acceptance.
DiciKso McLEAN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Discharge of Prior Party by Statute
of Limitations--Effect on Guarantor and Surety
If the statute of limitations has run in favor of the maker of a
negotiable instrument, is a guarantor or surety on the instrument dis-
charged under Negotiable Instruments Law §120(3),1 which provides
that "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged by the
discharge of a prior party ?" This question gives rise to two funda-
mental problems: first, is a surety or guarantor secondarily liable under
the Negotiable Instruments Law; second, does §120(3) include a dis-
charge of a prior party by the statute of limitations?
Negotiable Instruments Law §1922 stipulates that "The person pri-
marily liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the
instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are
secondarily liable." Obviously, under this section, the liability of a
guarantor of collection is secondary, as it is dependent upon the creditor
pursuing the principal debtor with due diligence. Whether the liability
of a guarantor of payment is primary or secondary, however, is subject
to some dispute. One court has held that a guarantor of payment is
primarily liable, but only after the maturity of the note, since after
," The rule of "last clear chance" is applied in some cases in which the plaintiff
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, as where he goes to sleep
on the tracks. Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 50 (1938). In Miller v. Southern Ry.,
205 N. C. 17, 169 S. E. 711 (1933), where the view was obstructed, the court said
the doctrine would not be applied because there was no evidence that the engineer
could have stopped after he discovered the driver was in a position of peril, and
this seems the better justification for refusing the application of the rule in this
situation.
," This trend may be reflected in the "insulation" of the railroad's negligence
by the driver's negligence depriving a passenger of his right to recover, and find-
ing contributory negligence as a matter of law where an automobile driver "out-
runs his headlights." Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-127(3) (1943).2N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-2 (1943).
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